Impaired concept acquisition in children with ASD: beyond the enhanced perceptual processing hypothesis  by Radenovic, Ljiljana
1877-0428 © 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.07.052
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 5 (2010) 69–73
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
WCPCG-2010
Impaired concept acquisition in children with ASD: beyond the 
enhanced perceptual processing hypothesis 
Ljiljana Radenovica *
a Milton and Ethel Research Initiative, York University, TEL Bldg. 4700 Keel Street, Toronto, Ontario CANADA, M3J 1P3 
Received January 14, 2010; revised February 6, 2010; accepted March 29, 2010 
Abstract 
Plaisted’s theory of enhanced perceptual processing (2001), developed to explain impaired concept acquisition in children with 
ASD, presupposes that perception of similarity is the basis of concept acquisition. Hence, it is grounded in the similarity-based
theory of concepts. This paper argues that the concept of similarity is a poor foundation for a viable theory of concept acquisition. 
Consequently, it argues for an account for how the child gets to see similarities in the course of development, instead of this
being understood as the basis of concept development. This paper suggests that such an account will require a closer look at the
development of multimodal perception and joint attention. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with significant social impairments, individuals with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) have been found 
to have certain difficulties with abstract reasoning (Klinger and Dawson 2001, Boucher 1977, Frith 1972, Plaisted, 
2000, Swettenham 1996, Ozonoff & Miller 1995). Given that the theory of mind literature largely remains silent 
about cognitive impairments in autism, the need for the alternative accounts is particularly pressing (Plaisted, 2000). 
In the current literature, there are two kinds of explanations for such cognitive deficits. Firstly, according to the 
theory of weak central coherence (Frith 1972), children with autism have an impaired built-in propensity to form 
coherence over various stimuli. Hence, they perform poorly on categorization and generalization tasks. Secondly, 
according to the enhanced perceptual processing hypothesis (Mottron & Burack 2001, Plaisted 2001), children with 
autism have problems placing stimuli into the same category at a higher level, because they have superefficient low-
level perceptual processing. 
The main objection to the theory of weak central coherence has been that it does not help us understand 
underlying psychological mechanisms responsible for the impairments in abstract reasoning (see e.g. Plaisted 2001), 
and as such, does not provide the full account of such deficits. While I would agree with this assessment, I would 
also argue that the enhanced perceptual processing hypothesis, as advocated by Plaisted (2001), cannot be a 
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satisfactory theory either, mainly because it moves too quickly from deficiencies on the perceptual level to 
deficiencies on the cognitive level. Her theory presupposes that normally-developing children, unlike children with 
autism, are able to treat objects and events as similar or dissimilar (and are therefore able to learn to categorize, 
generalize, and acquire concepts) simply because their perceptual apparatus allows them to perceive similarities 
directly. However, this suggests that Plaisted’s theory is grounded in the similarity-based theory of concepts. My 
goal in this paper is to argue that the concept of similarity, as proposed by similarity-based theories of concepts, is a 
poor foundation for a viable theory of concepts and concept acquisition. Although I share Plaisted’s view that 
sensory perception plays a crucial role in the development of abstract reasoning, I argue that the relation between 
perception and abstract reasoning is more complex and that concept acquisition as well as more flexible 
categorization and generalization abilities necessarily involves the ability to communicate and learn successfully 
from a caregiver. Thus, the development of concept acquisition, categorization, and generalization ties back to the 
development of joint attention and social cognition and cannot be derived from perceptual processes alone. 
Building on this point, I also argue that if we are to understand the role of sensory perception in the formation 
of concepts or generalization abilities, we need to take a closer look at the literature dealing with the development 
and function of sensory integration and multimodal perception. Studies on multimodal perception (Bahrick & 
Lickliter 2000; Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom 2004) suggest that the successful integration of information coming from 
different sensory modalities may actually make certain features of objects and events salient to a child, and this, in 
turn, determines how the child experiences the world and the objects in it. It is possible that such experiences 
provide the foundation for the development of the child’s ability to perceive relational similarities between objects 
and between events. However, as already noted, only through social interaction with a caregiver in general, and 
through non-verbal and verbal communication in particular, can the child learn different ways of classifying objects 
in the world and be flexible about it. Such communication begins as early as joint attentional scenes. Thus, it is my 
contention here that if we are to account for the origins of categorization, generalization, and concept acquisition, we 
need to account for the origins of joint attentional scenes. After addressing these issues, I will end the paper by 
suggesting a tentative account of the normal as well as of the derailed development of joint attention. 
2.  Plaisted’s theory of enhanced perceptual processing: some problems  
According to Plaisted, the impaired ability of individuals with autism to generalize and categorize objects and 
events in a flexible way stems from their “reduced processing of the similarities that hold between stimuli and 
between situations” (Plaisted 2001, p.159). This means that children with autism are not able to keep track of, i.e. to 
focus on, the features that different stimuli have in common. Instead, they focus on the unique features of stimuli.  
It is important to note that Plaisted’s theory of enhanced perceptual processing presupposes a particular view of 
the nature of concepts, and of the role that the notion of similarity plays in the formation of concepts. Although 
Pleistad is not explicit about whether she subscribes to the prototype or to exemplar theories of concept acquisition, 
it is clear that with respect to the structure of concepts, she holds that our concepts (at least most of them) are graded 
rather than well defined and are formed through the process of finding similarities between objects and events. 
But the seminal question remains: what is similarity? Unfortunately, the only way to be specific about similarity 
is to define similarity in terms of matching and mismatching properties. In the most prominent theory, that of 
Tversky (1977), similarity is defined as a function of common and distinctive features weighted for salience and 
importance. Plaisted’s notion of similarity does not deviate very far from this idea. She argues that if we are to see 
similarity between different stimuli and situations, we need to be able to process that these stimuli “share sufficient 
features or elements in common” (p.159). 
However, the concept of similarity, when defined this way, is a poor foundation for a viable theory of concepts 
and concept acquisition for two reasons. Firstly, similarity relationships among sets of entities depend heavily on the 
particular weights given to individual properties or features, but what counts as an important feature depends on the 
context. In other words, there is no unique answer to the question of how similar one entity is to another. Secondly, 
outside of the certain context, it is not even clear what counts as a feature or attribute. Thus, any two entities can be 
arbitrarily similar or dissimilar, depending on the criterion of what is to count as a relevant attribute. This means that 
what counts as a relevant feature when we look for similarities between different entities is not context-independent 
but, rather, is determined by the general background knowledge we have about that domain and our particular goal 
in that situation. 
If we accept that similarity between objects and events consists of matching the relevant features and if we 
accept that these features are context dependent, we still need to explain how the infant learns to distinguish between 
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relevant and irrelevant features and how the child learns to compare things and judge their similarity by adopting 
different criteria. 
That is, in order to provide adequate theory of category development, concept acquisition, and generalization, we 
need to account for how the child comes to see similarities in the process of development, rather starting with the 
perception of similarities as the basis of that development. To develop such theory, we must try to determine what 
exactly in the child’s first experiences with her caregivers and the world makes certain features of objects and events 
more salient than others. 
3. The role of intersensory perception and joint attention in concept acquisition 
Recent studies in intersensory perception (see e.g. Bahrick & Lickliter 2000; Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom 2004) 
indicate that the intersensory perception of amodal features of objects and events (i.e. features that are perceived 
through more than one sensory channel) seems to precede the perception of unimodal features of objects. According 
to Bahrick and Lickliter’s intersensory redundancy hypothesis, infants’ attention is facilitated if certain stimuli are 
specified through more than one sense. If the child is presented with the same stimuli through only one sensory 
modality, she is not able to perceptually differentiate the stimuli with the same success as when these same stimuli 
are presented through two sense modalities (Bahrick & Lickliter 2000). This is particularly apparent in early infancy 
and has profound implications for the trajectory of perceptual learning. More specifically, if child’s attention is 
captured by aspects of sensory stimulation that come from several sense modalities, it means that multimodal (i.e. 
intersensory) perception “gives initial advantage to the perceptual processing of, learning of, and memory for 
stimulus properties that are redundant or amodal (e.g. synchrony, rhythm, and intensity) at the expense of modality-
specific properties (e.g. color, pitch, and timbre) that can be perceived through only one sense” (Bahrick, Lickliter & 
Flom 2004, p. 99).
It is not unreasonable to assume that the primacy of intersensory perception in early infancy facilitates the 
development of the child’s ability to notice overall similarities between objects and between events, and provides 
the context in which it is possible for her to compare everyday routines and objects that she sees. Given that 
synchrony, rhythm, and intensity provide important information about how objects appear in real time and space and 
are salient features facilitating the child’s attention, the first similarities that children notice might be the ones 
marked by these amodal properties. Furthermore, this initial step might be the foundation for the development of the 
child’s ability to perceive similarities among properties that are given through one sensory modality. 
Given that children with autism suffer from sensory integration and sensory processing problems (Anzalone & 
Williamson 2001; Greenspan & Shanker 2004), it is likely that they do not receive or make use of the overlapping 
information about objects and events that is provided simultaneously through several sense modalities. If this is the 
case, their initial experience of the world and the objects in it has to differ in a substantial way from the way normal 
children experience it. We can hypothesize that the enhanced perceptual processing they exhibit in different sensory 
modalities is the result or side effect of compromised intersensory perception. Furthermore, we can hypothesize that 
amodal features of objects (such as synchrony, rhythm, and intensity) do not capture their attention and therefore do 
not have the saliency they have for normally-developing children. This means that amodal features cannot play as 
important a role in the organization of experiences in children with autism as they might in normally-developing 
children. This might be one reason for the derailed development of the autistic population’s ability to perceive 
similarity between objects and between events.
However, as already noted, the development of categorization and generalization cannot be entirely grounded in 
perceptual learning and explained only by mechanisms independent from social interaction. This means that 
learning to categorize objects by their shape, color, material, the way they move, the way they are used, or by 
numerous other characteristics we choose to be relevant in a particular situation, is possible only by the child’s 
participation in social activities with caregivers. During everyday routines in which both caregiver and child 
participate, the child gets to deal with different objects and manipulate them in different ways. In this way, she starts 
to treat different objects as parts of the same or of different themes and gets to know their functional properties. 
Moreover, during these activities, caregivers direct the child’s attention to different aspects of objects and situations, 
and in this way, teach her (among other things) about their relevant and irrelevant aspects. They also implicitly 
and/or explicitly communicate to the child that things can be categorized in different ways.  
Communication that is essential for such learning starts as soon as the first joint attentional scenes emerge. 
What is important to note is that the child who is able to participate in joint attentional scenes is able to make use of 
the caregiver’s communicative signals. Being preverbal, these signals consist of expressions of approval, 
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disapproval, surprise, and the like (i.e. they at least partially consist of emotional expressions). A clear sign that the 
child is able to make use of the communicative signals of a caregiver can be seen in her ability to follow the gaze of 
the caregiver and determine the object(s) to which the caregiver intends her to attend.
It is well known that participation in joint attentional scenes emerges very late in the development of autistic 
children (Kasari, Sigman, Mundi, & Yirmiya 1990; Leekam, Lopez, and Moore 2000; Loveland, & Landry 1986). 
Considerable delay in joint attention is usually seen as the main culprit in the delay of language acquisition and the 
impaired development of social cognition in these children. The question is, however, what prevents these children 
from participating in such interactions? 
4. The origins of joint attention: a tentative account 
While there are a number of theories about the causes of impaired joint attention in children with autism, there 
is some evidence that it might be the outcome of the abnormalities in intermodal perception, sensory integration, and 
sensory reactivity from which these children suffer in various forms and degrees. Recent studies have shown that 
normally-developing children first come to recognize emotional expressions by relying on intersensory perceptions. 
Later, they are able to focus on voice or facial expression and to extract emotional meaning from these alone 
(Walker-Andrews 1997). This means that the ability to recognize certain expressions depends on the proper 
integration of stimuli coming through vision, sound, and touch. Consequently, if the sensory channels do not work 
properly, the child will not be able to recognize emotional expressions, and this will compromise her ability to grasp 
the emotional meanings of these expressions. Furthermore, along with abnormalities in intersensory perception, 
peculiarities in the sensitivity to outside stimuli might interfere with the normal emotional development of these 
children, which, in turn, might interfere with the development of their understanding of emotional signals 
(Greenspan & Shanker 2004). 
Indeed, being able to grasp the meanings of emotional expressions underpins the child’s ability to make use of 
the caregiver’s communicative intentions and, accordingly, to share interests with the caregiver, to participate in 
social referencing, and so on. Because they are not able to make use of emotional signals, children with autism are 
prevented from learning about different aspects of objects, how they can be used, and how they can be categorized 
according to the needs of particular situations or according to their different perceptual, functional, and other 
qualities. Without this ability, children with autism lack the necessary tools to become less rigid in categorization 
tasks. Moreover, without this ability, children with autism cannot learn to be flexible in regards to the boundaries of 
concepts and their content. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that both perceptual and social learning are necessary for the development of 
concept acquisition, categorization, and generalization. This point has not been fully acknowledged in Plaisted’s 
theory of enhanced perceptual processing which builds on the problematic view of concept acquisition; that is, it 
presupposes that the perception of similarity is the basis of concept acquisition. However, the problem is that 
similarity between objects and between events depends on the context. Therefore, we need to account for how the 
child comes to acquire the ability to determine what is important in a given context and hence to notice similarities 
between objects and between events.  
In addition to its conceptual problems, Plaisted’s theory does not take into account the recent studies in 
intermodal perception which indicate that intermodal perception and the perception of amodal features have primacy 
over unimodal perception in early infancy. This research suggests that intermodal perception determines how the 
infant experiences objects in the world. Moreover, it suggests that intermodal perception, along with sensory 
reactivity, contributes in the essential way to the development of the child’s ability to grasp the emotional meanings 
that the caregiver communicates in joint attentional scenes. If this is true, it follows that the impairment in sensory 
integration, sensory processing, and sensory reactivity widely present in children with autism might be the main 
culprit in the impairment of their social learning and, consequently, in the impairment of their concept acquisition, 
categorization, and generalization abilities.  
In sum, it is important to note that the hypothesis I have proposed aims to provide an explanation of two things. 
Firstly, it aims to explain how the disturbance in the multimodal perception and sensory integration may 
compromise both what the child sees as the salient features of objects and her capacity for social learning. Secondly, 
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it aims to explain how the compromised development of social cognition may result in a more severe impairment of 
concept acquisition, categorization, and generalization. Further empirical research is needed, of course, but close 
study of the role of intersensory perception in the development of social cognition and abstract reasoning seems a 
promising direction to take. Such research would certainly help us better understand how the abnormalities in the 
former relate to the impairments in the latter in the case of children with autism. 
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